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BOOK REVIEW
The World Court in Action: Judging Among the Nations. By
Howard N. Meyer, 2002. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 2002, Pp. 309. Softcover. $26.95.
Reviewed by Jennifer R. Johnson* & Ami Mudd De Celle**
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1905, Massachusetts led the United States in instituting an
order for all schools to celebrate May 18, the anniversary of the first
Hague Conference,' an international conference set up to discuss
establishing the "American idea" of substituting law for war.2 By
contrast, international law is not even part of the standard curriculum in
American law schools today; rather it is a "subject for specialists. 3
For those who want to learn about the history of the "World Court
' 4
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University School of Law; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara.
** Book Review Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 43; J.D. Candidate, Santa
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1. See HOWARD N. MEYER, THE WORLD COURT tN ACTION: JUDGING AMONG THE
NATIONS 26 (2002). May 18, 1899, was the first day of the Hague conference, set up to
discuss the ongoing arms race, the rules of warfare, and methods of avoiding war through
alternative dispute resolution. See id. at 17. Hague, the capital of the Netherlands, was the
first to be asked and offered to house the conference. See id. at 14.
2. See id. at 13. The concept was often deemed an "American idea" or "plan" because
the idea was the result of a peaceful arbitration between the U.S. and the English over the
attacks by the English ship called The Alabama. See id at 5; see also infra Part II. In
addition, many of the ideas for the structure and function of the World Court were based
upon the U.S. Supreme Court, which had successfully, save the Civil War, settled the
differences of the thirteen original, independent colonies. See id at 14. The World Court
[hereinafter the Court] is the unofficial shorthand for the International Court of Justice, the
mission of which is to judge and decide disputes that nations are unable to decide among
themselves.
3. See id. at 5. These sentiments were expressed by Midwest philosopher Haskell
Fain in 1987. See id. The law of Nations (international law) has slowly developed since
1648, the end of the Thirty Years' War in Europe. The law came from no sovereign decree,
rather it evolved much like common law, and early on it was called "Customary Law." See
id. at 5.
4. One enduring result of the conference was the creation of what was to become
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and the United States' role in its formation, evolution, and
effectiveness, 5 Howard N. Meyer's book, The World Court in Action:
Judging Among the Nations, 6 is a good primer on the topic. Meyer is a
lawyer and well-regarded social historian,7 and his familiarity and
comfort with the subject matter shines through as he details the
creation and key decisions of the Court.
Through illustrations of the purpose and practice of the Court,
Meyer shows how American refusal to submit disputes with other
nations to the Court seems, in thewords of the U.S. State Department's
Earnest A. Gross, 8 "out of keeping with the traditional American
respect for the judicial process as prime guarantor of the rule of law."9
In his book, Meyer follows two themes: (1) Americans have helped,
and ultimately succeeded in creating a World Court; and (2) the World
Court now exists as an able institution reflecting American effort that
should bring pride to the United States. 0
Meyer makes a strong and persuasive argument for why the
United States should become a true participant in what could then
legitimately be called the World Court, a court formed as a result of a
successful U.S. arbitration experience and based upon the U.S.
Supreme Court."I The resulting book is an articulate, authoritative,
well-written analysis of the history of the Court; U.S. support of, and
today's International Court of Justice (ICJ), or "World Court." See id. at 18. At the end of
the conference, the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established - a precursor to today's
World Court. See id.
5. The goal of such a tribunal was to create a neutral third party arbiter to settle
disputes between nations instead of turning to war. See id. at xi. Although the 1899
Conference partially succeeded in that goal, the Court at that time was not a "true" court.
See id. at 18. It was an international dispute resolution body, but it left arbitration by the
Court a voluntary matter, left the U.S. Senate free to veto U.S. participation in individual
cases, and failed to include the permanent career judges as the original visionaries had
intended. See id. at 18-19. One aspect of the former Court exists today, U.S. refusal to
agree to mandatory jurisdiction by the Court. See id. at xi. However, until 1985, the United
States subscribed to "elective compulsory jurisdiction" (although with specific limiting
reservations), wherein members of the United Nations (under the procedures of the Court at
that time) through their voluntary membership agreed to arbitrate international disputes at
the court. See id. at 95-98.
6. See MEYER, supra note 1.
7. Meyer focuses on the history of major epochs and emblematic political actors. His
other books include THE MAGNIFICENT ACTIVIST: THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
WENTWORTH HIGGINSON (2000) and THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE: EQUALITY
& JUSTICE DEFERRED THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2000), the later of
which was nominated for a Pultzer Prize. See id. at 311.
8. See id. at 98. Mr. Gross was U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in the early
1950s. See id.
9. See id.
10. Seeid.at235.
1I. See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
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later resistance to, participation in the Court; and the almost entirely
successful record of the ICJ. However, the title of the book is a bit
deceiving. At first glance, one is lead to believe that the book is a
summary of World Court decisions. While the book does lay out the
Court's decisions, it also achieves Meyer's silent goal of persuading
the reader that the World Court is "an untapped resource for peace' 2 in
which the United States has shunned full participation. Therefore, a
more telling title for his book might be "The World Court in Action
and Judging Our Nation."
This book review summarizes the major sections of Meyer's book,
which include: (1) the idea and formation of the first World Court
(prologue-chapter 6); (2) the transition to, and decisions of, the second
(present) World Court (chapters 7-15, 17-18); and (3) a discussion of
whether the World Court was a success or a failure (chapter 16 and
throughout).
II. THE IDEA AND FORMATION OF THE FIRST WORLD COURT
Although this section of Meyer's book is very fact-intensive, the
historical background he presents is helpful to the average reader and
likely expands the book's audience, as Meyer makes the Court's
detailed history easy for the layman to understand.
As detailed in the book, in 1862 the English ship The Alabama,
later joined by other ships, conducted a series of attacks on a total of
eighty U.S. merchant ships. The U.S. public was enraged when the
USS Kearsage sank the Alabama, finding this act no less treasonous
than the attacks retaliated against.13  Then President Andrew Grant
avoided further confrontation by negotiating a treaty to submit the
Alabama claims to neutral, third party arbitration. 14 The U.S. damage
award was $15.5 million (roughly the value of the destroyed ships), but
the greater victory was held to be "for peace and arbitration."' 5 This
success was seen as definitive evidence of the feasibility of substituting
arbitration for war,' 6 and fueled discussion by European peacemakers
for a permanent arbitration tribunal, which they called the "American
12. See Howard N. Meyer, The World Court: An Untapped Resource for Peace, SOKA
GAKKAI INT'L Q., No. 17 (July 1999),
available at http://www.sgi.org/english/archives/quarterly/9907/perspective.html
[hereinafter SGI website].
13. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 1-2.
14. See id. at 2.
15. See id. These are the words of admiral and historian Samuel Eliot Morrison. See
id.
16. See id. at 4.
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plan."'
17
The culmination of U.S. and foreign energies18 resulted in the
Hague Conference of 1899.19 Although the concept of an international
court of arbitration was only one of the goals of the conference, it
became the central aspect of it.20  What emerged was the so-called
Permanent Court of Arbitration, which contained the essential features
of the American plan, but contained no commitment to arbitrate, a
feature that would cripple the Court's virility for decades to come.
2 1
The international response to the results of the conference was the
negotiation of more than 150 treaties within a few years.22 However,
many believed the aims of the Court were not yet satisfied. Ideas
emerged for converting the Court to an entity with a true panel of
permanently sitting judges and for a second Hague Conference.23 One
ironic flaw the first conference suffered was the exclusion of the
Central and South American countries-ironic because arbitration had
flourished among these nations in the nineteenth century.24
When the Court had sat for a few years with no case yet
decided, President Theodore Roosevelt2 5  became interested in
supporting the Court. When Roosevelt asked Baron d'Estournelles, a
French Parliament member who had been to Hague in 1899, what he
could do to help, the baron suggested Roosevelt could give life to the
Court, which he did.26
17. See id. at 5; see also supra note 3. American peace groups, including The
American Peace Society, the Universal Peace Union, and the Women's Christian
Temperance Union joined in galvanizing U.S. participation in a plan for peace through
arbitration. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 13-14. An early leader of the U.S. effort was
Edward Everett Hale, who predicted in 1879 that the United States would lead an effort to
form an international tribunal by the turn of the century. See id. at 12-14. Hale was joined
by Edwin D. Mead, also a leader in reform activities. See id.
18. Invitations to the initial Hague meeting were sent only to nations with diplomatic
ties to Czar Nicholas II of Russia, so the Latin American countries, save Mexico, were
excluded. Id. at 22.
19. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 18.
20. See id. at 19.
21. See id. at 18-19, xi. The conference ended in July, 1899. See id.
22. See id. at 21.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 22. During the nineteenth century, the theory and practice of arbitration
flourished, illustrated by the sculpture known as "The Christ of the Andes" towering over
the Argentina-Chile border. The statue symbolized the peaceful end of conflict over
Patagonia to the south of the two countries, the arbitration over which Edward VII of Britain
had been arbitrator. See id.
25. Roosevelt was the successor to McKinley'upon his assassination on September 6,
1901. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 22.
26. See id. at 24. President Roosevelt first agreed to show support for the idea of an
international court in an effort to win support of as many as possible in the growing peace
movement. Later, Roosevelt would be seen as a peacemaker in the war between Japan and
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The first case the Court decided was a dispute between the United
States and Mexico over the "Pious Fund," which was a 200 year old
Jesuit investment supporting priestly work in California when the state
was a remote province of Mexico; the countries were in conflict, each
believing it was the proper owner of the fund.27 A formal hearing was
held at the Hague for ten days, and the five-judge panel held that the
bishops' rights survived the separation of California and Mexico.28
Shortly thereafter, Andrew Carnegie, a multi-millionaire and
industrialist, offered the funds to build a "courthouse" to hold the
Court, which came to be called the "Peace Palace."2 9
In 1904, war erupted between Japan and Russia, although both
countries had signed the treaty.3° Despite the war, the Hague II
Conference was imminent by 1907; during the conference a plan of
organization for the World Court was created by the forty-six nations
in attendance, and then was shelved for several years.3 ' After the war,
which was soon followed by World War I, some believed the Court
was a failure.32 However, Jane Addams, who had won worldwide fame
as a social worker,33 said that the Court could no more be seen as a
failure because of World War I than the U.S. federal government could
be seen as a failure because of the American Civil War. 34
Following World War I, the League of Nations, headed by the
efforts of Elihu Root,35 formed a plan for the Court to be affiliated with
the League in just six weeks. 36 However, the founders of the Court
faced the problem of who the "permanent" judges would be when there
were forty-six (now 150) countries to select from.3 7 The idea was
Russia that began in 1904, for which he would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1908. See
id. at 24-25.
27. See id. at 24. The first case was heard in 1902. Although it would never have led
to war, it was still seen as a great success. See id.
28. See id. at 24.
29. See id. The Peace Palace, funded by a donation of $15 million by Carnegie, was
built at the site of the first Hague Conference in the Netherlands. See id.
30. See id. at 25. Both Japan and Russia had signed the 1899 Covenant of the Hague.
See id.
31. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 29.
32. See id. at 37.
33. Addams was a pioneer in Chicago's Hull House, a place of relief for the poor and
victims of unregulated business exploitation. See id. at 38.
34. See id. at 37.
35. Seventy-five years old at the time, Root, a former secretary of state and a U.S.
senator, had spent fifteen years of his life contributing to the idea of the World Court. See
id. at 41.
36. See id. at 41.
37. See id. The number of judges desired was based upon the numer of total number of
exisiting nation states at that time. See id.
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again American in origin-mirroring the selection of Senators and
Representatives from the several United States.38
What the new plan hoped for was "compulsory" jurisdiction for
states with unresolved disputes; what it got was "optional" jurisdiction,
wherein each nation had the option of subscribing to the "club" and
subscription imputed agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising
between members of the "club.",39  The other novel feature was the
ability for the Court to give advisory opinions, novel in the sense that
the United States believed the adversary process to be the best method
for resolving disputes. 40 The provision that made this system possible
was that any nation state that believed it had an interest in the outcome
of the advisory case could be heard.41 However, this aspect of the
Court also came to be what opposers, including the United States
through the leadership of Charles Evan Hughes42 and William Edgar
Borah,43 focused on as a reason to abstain from membership in the
Court.
44
Despite United States' opposition, the Permanent Court of
International Justice's regular sessions opened for business on June 15,
1922 at the Peace Palace. 45 As Hale had forecast some years before,
the Court's cases increased in importance over time.46 Over the course
of eighty years, the two Courts had rendered over 200 decisions, only
two of which were not followed. 7 Meyer makes note of the fact that
though the Court resulted from strong public interest, there was (and
still is) ignorance as to what goes on inside the doors of the "Peace
Palace. 48 Meyer sees the words of Sir Alfred Zimmern in the 1920s as
relevant still today: "[T]he relationship between the new Court set up at
the Hague and the peoples whose law, or laws, it interprets is still
38. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 41-42. Root suggested the "example which naturally
arises in the mind of an American" for how to make a representative system work with such
diverse participants, telling the group about the two-chamber U.S. Congress, with equal
representation in the Senate and proportional representation in the house. See id. at 41.
39. See id. at 43.
40. See id. at 43-44. Although unknown at the time, advisory opinions would come to
make up a large number of the Court's opinions over the years. See id.
41. See id. at 44.
42. Hughes was President Harding's Secretary of State, a lawyer, former leader for
reform and liberal causes, former Supreme Court Justice (1910-1916), and former
unsuccessful presidential candidate. See id. at 46.
43. Borah was also lawyer, a senior Senator from Idaho, and an advocate of liberal
ideas. See id.
44. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 44-47.
45. See id. at 57.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 57. See also supra note 5.
48. See id. at 78.
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extremely tenuous. 4 9
Although public exposure to the Court was minimal, what Meyer
sees as the final blows to a true World Court were abstention by the
Soviet Union and the action of the U.S. Senate in 1935, which Meyer
describes as the United States' "final refusal" to join the international
community.50 In September of 1940, the Court shut down as the
second World War expanded .
As mentioned earlier, this section is very fact-intensive and
therefore a bit more difficult to digest than the rest of the text. In
addition, this section is emblematic of the clearly American slant of
Meyer's writing.
III. THE SECOND (AND PRESENT) WORLD COURT
The next section of the book traces the creation of a "new" world
court in the aftermath of World War 11.52 Meyer skillfully guides the
reader from the prior section's discussion of the first Court into a
discussion of how the modem Court was fonned. In particular Meyer
does a good job of highlighting the changes made to the structure of the
modem Court and why these changes are important to how the Court
functions.
As the Second World War came to an end, members of the
international community met to discuss plans for a new organization of
nations 3  In 1945, the founding conference of the United Nations
(UN) was held in San Francisco, at which delegates discussed, among
other things, what form the new World Court should take.54 There was
a general consensus among the international community that the PCIJ
had been a success.55 The UN delegates therefore sought to make the
"new" Court largely similar in function and structure to the PCIJ. The
new Court-called the "International Court of Justice" (ICJ)56-met for
the first time on April 18, 1946, at the Peace Palace. 57
Meyer outlines some noteworthy changes between the PCIJ and
the new ICJ. One change was the decision that the new Court would
49. See id. Zimmern, a diplomat and historian, observed this with regret in his League
of Nations history. See generally SIR ALFRED ZIMMERN, THE AMERICAN ROAD TO WORLD
PEACE (). See id. at 78.
50. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 85.
51. See id. at 86.
52. See id. at 87-99.
53. See id. at 87.
54. See id. at 88.
55. See id.
56. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 88.
57. See id. at 94; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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function as a "principal organ" of the United Nations.58 This was a
fundamental change from the role of the PCIJ, which was a parallel
organization to the League of Nations.59 The new Court's statute was
to be adopted simultaneously with the UN Charter and members of the
UN were to be automatically subject to the statute's obligations and
privileges. 60  Another difference from the PCIJ was the decision to
stagger the election of judges. 61  Borrowing from the process for
electing U.S. senators, one-third of the Court's judges were to stand for
election every three years62-a major step toward ensuring the
continuity and efficiency of the Court. An additional change to the
function of the Court was a broadening of the availability of "advisory
opinions." Although the United States originally resisted the power of
the court to issue "advisory" opinions,63 by 1945 the United States
delegates recognized the guidance provided by such opinions and
supported a broadening of their availability.64 Meyer notes that this
change allowed more than a dozen UN-related groups to petition the
Court directly.65
While designing the new Court, the subject again arose about the
type of jurisdiction the Court would have over UN members. As
Meyer discussed in the first section of the book, most members of the
international community favored "universal, 66 jurisdiction, meaning
presumption of consent upon joining the UN.67 However, both the
United States and the Soviet Union opposed it.68 President Truman at
first lent his support to such jurisdiction, stating, "If we are going to
have a court it ought to be a court that would work, with compulsory
jurisdiction. 69  He later backed away from this sentiment when he
learned that the U.S. Senate was not in favor of the idea that U.S.
foreign policy would be at the mercy of decisions made by a court it
could not control. 70 The other UN members were hopeful that in the
58. This would mean that the court would have equal standing to both the General
Assembly and Security Council. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 88.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 89.
62. Each judge serves a term of nine years, the same term length under the PCIJ. See
id.
63. See id. at 89-90.
64. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 89-90.
65. See id.
66. This type of jurisdiction is also referred to as "compulsory" jurisdiction. See id. at
90.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 90.
70. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 90. Meyer provides a brief description of how and
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future the Court could achieve a somewhat universal impact with more
and more nations adhering to the optional clause.71
Throughout the book Meyer frequently mentions the reluctance of
the United States to submit to the Court's jurisdiction. This can be
confusing to the reader because Meyer attempts to explain that the
United States was against submission to the Court's jurisdiction but
often fails to explain why the United States behaves as it does. In this
section, for example, Meyer fails to explain specifically why the U.S.
Senate would be so concerned with controlling the Court. This absence
of explanation leaves the reader wishing that Meyer had provided a bit
more information on how many Senators actually were against such
jurisdiction, whether such sentiments were drawn across party lines,
and whether the American public shared the opinion of the U.S. Senate.
IV. THE DECISIONS OF THE ICJ
Meyer spends the remainder of the book outlining some of the
ICJ's most important decisions on international law in both adversarial
and advisory situations. He examines the role of the Court in
interpreting the UN charter itself, highlights some of the Court's
decisions on transnational force and global law, and discusses the ICJ's
role in African de-colonization. Meyer also discusses the issue of
ownership on land and at sea. Finally, he discusses the cases involving
East Timor and Kosovo and concludes with a discussion of the Court's
role in the effort to ban nuclear weapons.
In general, this section of the book is by far the most interesting.
Meyer provides a well-organized look at the major decisions of the ICJ
without bogging the reader down with too many details about the cases.
While some of the major cases-U.S. hostages in Iran and U.N.
sanctions against Libya, for example-made newspaper headlines, many
other cases were not covered by the mainstream media. Meyer
explains why some of the lesser known cases were important to the
development of international law 72  and how others reflected
why the United States was unwilling, or unable, to submit to the Court's jurisdiction. See id.
at 95-98.
71. See id. at 90; see also id at 37-50. In 1945 Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon
introduced a resolution pushing for President Truman to accept the "optional clause,".
thereby submitting the United States voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Court. See id. at
95. The clause was eventually accepted, but Senator Tom Connally added that consent to be
sued could be withdrawn in cases of domestic jurisdiction "as determined by the United
States." See id. at 130.
72. For example, Meyer discusses the Court's interpretation of the U.N. charter. See
id. at p. 103.
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developments around the world.73 In addition, he does an excellent job
at describing the better known cases from the perspective of ICJ and
allows the readers to better understand how nations, acting as litigants,
bring a case before the ICJ, and attempt to have a dispute settled.
A. Interpreting the U.N. Charter
Soon after the ICJ opened its doors, it reviewed a case whose
principle issue was whether the UN had standing to sue a state for
reparations. 74  Meyer describes how this case was important to
establishing the rights of the newly formed United Nations and setting
a precedent for how the Court was going to function in settling disputes
involving the U.N. Charter. In 1948 the U.N. sought reparations from
Israel for the murder of one of its agents.75 Meyer notes that while the
rules of international law recognized one state's right to take legal
action in relation to another state, the question remained whether the
UN had a right to take such action on behalf of itself. The General
Assembly submitted the matter to the ICJ and requested an advisory
opinion.76 The Court held that the UN could assert a claim, basing its
rationale on an approach used by U.S. Chief Justice John Marshall, 7
who gave great respect to the intent of the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution.78 When applying this approach to the Bernadotte issue,
the opinion of the ICJ stated, "To answer this question, which is not
settled by the actual terms of the Charter, we must consider what
characteristics it was intended to give to the organization. '' 79 It further
opined that the UN was an independent being, which Meyer likens to a
corporation, in so much as it is an entity independent of its individual
shareholders.80 After the Court issued the opinion, the UN presented
Israel with a claim for damages, which Israel promptly paid in full.
81
73. For example, Meyer discusses the cases involving African de-colonization and the
use of transnational force. See id.
74. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 103.
75. In 1948, the Security Council sent the president of the Swedish Red Cross, Count
Folke Bernadotte, to Palestine in the hopes that he could successfully broker an end to the
conflict that began when the British Mandate ended. See id. at 103. Bernadotte's plan was
rejected by both sides and three months later, while still trying to mediate between the
parties, Bernadotte was murdered by "Jewish assailants." See id. UN Secretary-General
Trygvie Lie believed that the UN had a right to demand reparations "for injuries to its
agents." See id.
76. See id. at 103-04.
77. See id. at 104.
78. See id. In one famous opinion Marshall said, "[w]e must never forget that it is a
Constitution we are expounding." See id. at 104.
79. See id.
80. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 104.
81. See id. at 105.
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Here, Meyer does a good job of using a case to show how the
Court has played an important role in lending legitimacy to the UN, as
both an independent body with its own rights and as a representative of
its member nations. In addition, Meyer again shows how the ICJ holds
the U.S. Supreme Court and its Justices in high regard as a model for
interpreting a Constitution-or, in this case, the Charter.
B. Global Law
The Court's decisions on the subject of transnational force and
global law highlight the troubled relationship between the United
States and the ICJ. 82 Among these decisions are the cases involving
Iran and Nicaragua. 83 In 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran was
taken over by demonstrators, and Embassy personnel were taken
hostage.84 Within days, the United States filed suit with the ICJ
demanding that the hostages be freed.85 The Court issued a preliminary
injunction ordering the Americans to be released.86 The Iranians
refused to comply and while the case was pending, the United States
launched a botched rescue attempt.87 Meyer argues that this move by
the United States underscored the basic lack of respect for the Court.88
Although the Court decided to award the United States reparations and
ordered the release of the hostages, the Court issued a statement that
"The Court... feels bound to observe that an operation undertaken in
those circumstances, from whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to
undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations.' 89
Meyer chronicles how the United States continued to show its
disrespect for the Court during the Nicaragua case. In March 1981,
President Reagan authorized the CIA to undertake covert operations
against Nicaragua. 90 Nicaragua filed a complaint with the ICJ alleging
that the United States' actions of supplying support for the insurgent
force (contras) violated international law. 91 Meyer then details the
various attempts that the United States made during this time to
challenge the jurisdiction of the Court.92 When the Court ultimately
82. See id. at 127.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 127.
87. See id. at 129.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 130.
91. See id. at 130-31.
92. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 131-34.
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ruled that the United States had consented to jurisdiction, America
walked out of the proceedings and refused to participate.93 Meyer
gives the reader an accurate depiction of the reaction of the
international community to the U.S. actions. However, the weakness in
these chapters is that Meyer does not present a very in-depth discussion
of why the United States behaved as it did. Thus, the reader is left only
with a sense of how the rest of world thought America should have
behaved.
Next, Meyer discusses the involvement of the ICJ in African de-
colonization.94 Meyer notes the important role played by the Court in
deciding the fate of Namibia95 and Morocco.96 In each of these cases,
the ICJ was asked to determine ownership of an area of land that had
previously been a colony of a western European nation.97 In addition,
Meyer highlights important decisions by the Court regarding an
ownership dispute involving the English Channel islets of Minquiers
and Ecrehos,98 a dispute between Thailand and Cambodia over a
historic temple, 99 and a border dispute between Nicaragua and
Honduras. 00 The decisions issued by the ICJ in each of these cases
resulted in an end to that dispute. Meyer concludes this section with a
discussion of how the Court has helped settle issues of continental shelf
ownership,' 0' coastal baselines 10 2 and fishing rights. 0 3 Again, Meyer
highlights how the Court has successfully adjudicated the disputes in
these cases.
To improve this section of the book, Meyer could have included a
discussion of how the Court's involvement was viewed by other
countries. Such insight would have juxtaposed the way foreign
politicians and the public viewed the role of the ICJ with how the
United States viewed the Court. This might help the reader to better
understand why the United States, even today, is opposed to the
Court's authority, especially considering all the cases in which disputes
have been successfully resolved.
93. See id. at 135-36.
94. See id. at 139-54.
95. See id. at 139-50.
96. See id. at 150-54.
97. See id. at 139-54.
98. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 155-56.
99. See id. at 157-58.
100. See id. at 156-57.
101. See id. at 164-65.
102. See id. at 162-64.
103. See id. at 166-69.
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C. The Early 90s: Court Jurisdiction is Ignored and Trumped
Meyer next addresses the issue of what to do when a decision of
the Court is ignored. 10 4 For the most part, decisions by the ICJ are
accepted and the parties involved comply with the decision.'05 When
the United States failed to recognize the Court's decision on Nicaragua,
the Security Council attempted to decide upon measures to give effect
to the judgment; the United States vetoed the Council's decision.1
0 6
The result was that the United Nations could not enforce the
decision. 10 7 Meyer argues, however, that the decision of the Court did
have an impact on U.S. involvement in the region and ultimately
played a large part in bringing an end to hostilities,'0 8 arguing that this
can be seen in the relationship between the United States, Nicaragua,
and the ICJ on the issue of reparations. 10 9 Although the United States
again failed to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court, Meyer intimates
that the involvement of the Court put pressure on the U.S. to settle the
matter privately with Nicaragua rather than face reparations." 0
Next Meyer describes the effort by Libya against the United States
and the United Kingdom to enforce the Montreal Convention Treaty.
In 1991, a District of Columbia grand jury indicted two Libyan
nationals for the 1988 terrorist destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland."' The United States and the United Kingdom
demanded from Libya that it turn over the two suspects, to which Libya
responded that it would investigate the matter. The countries reiterated
their demand, and Libya responded that it would submit the matter to
the ICJ. 112 Under the Montreal Convention, to which the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Libya are all signatories, any matter upon
which the parties cannot agree to submit to arbitration may be taken to
the World Court." 3 The UN imposed drastic sanctions against Libya
104. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 171-81.
105. See id. at 171.
106. See id. at 174-75. Meyer points out that the UN Charter provided that a party to a
dispute should not participate in voting on a matter to which it is a party. See id. at 174.
Meyer further notes that though the U.S. veto could be ignored in this instance, no member
of the Council raised the issue. See id. at 175.
107. See id. at 174-75.
108. See id. at 175.
109. See id. at 185-86.
110. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 185-86.
111. See id. at 195.
112. See id. at 195-96. Though the ICJ cannot hear matters of an individual's criminal
guilt or innocence, Libya sought to have the ICJ look at the enforceability of the Montreal
Convention. See id. at 196.
113. See id.
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for its failure to turn over the accused. 14 However, Libya argued that
the United States and United Kingdom were bound to seek resolution
of the matter before issuing sanctions.' 15 In such cases, where there is
conflict as to whether to apply the UN Charter or a treaty between
states, the UN Charter trumps.1 6  Libya ultimately declined to
surrender, and the UN promptly imposed sanctions."
1 7
In the book's final chapters, Meyers looks at the issues most
currently facing the Court. As Court President Sir Robert Jennings
reported, "after decades of underuse the Court now has a full docket of
important cases."" 8  Included in these cases are issues of
"humanitarian intervention" in Kosovo 119 and ownership of East
Timor. 120 Finally, Meyer looks at the possibility of Court intervention
in the issue of nuclear arms testing and proliferation.'
21
By including such timely issues in the book, Meyer connects the
past decisions of the ICJ to the issues of today. This connection aids
the reader in understanding how the history of the Court is relevant to
issues that international law presently faces.
V. WAS THE COURT A SUCCESS OR A FAILURE?
Bernard Loder, a Dutch representative, stated at the establishment
of the World Court in 1920, that "administer[ing] justice between two
contesting parties only after having obtained their mutual consent[,]...
agreement on the wording of the complaint[,] and [ ] choice of judges"
would be "not worth the trouble."1 22 Meyer suggests that if viewed
through the eyes of Andrew Carnegie or other peace enthusiasts of the
early twentieth century, the answer to whether it was "worth the
trouble" may well be "no.' 23 The Court did not abolish or prevent
war, nor has the Court become a court of "compulsory jurisdiction.' ' 24
Meyer clearly sees this absent aspect as the failing point of the Court, if
it has failed at all.'
25
114. See id. at 200.
115. See id. at 198.
116. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 200.
117. See id. at 198.
118. See id. at217.
119. See id. at 223-26.
120. See id. at 221-24.
121. See id. at 227-34.
122. See MEYER, supra note 1, at 205.
123. See id. at 206.
124. See id. at 206-07.
125. However, other disagree with the idea of the Court as a failure. For example, Jane
Addams said:
[T]his great war cannot stamp International Arbitration as a failure .... When the
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Meyer documents the early support of the United States-in the
form of Presidents, congressmen, Supreme Court Justices, and law
school deans and professors-to settle disputes through persuasive
means. 126 In so doing, Meyer suggests that what continues to make the
question itself, "Was it worth the trouble?" even a consideration hinges
on the United States maintaining its stance of immunity from the
Court's judgment. 127
Meyer says that it is easy to question the effectiveness of a World
Court, yet no court has power of its own-it must be given its power
from the community it serves. 128 He believes the fact that most of the
Court's decisions have been followed demonstrates that the Court has
been given this power.1 29 However, Meyer makes no mention made of
exactly why the United States refrains from compulsory jurisdiction.
One possibility is that the United States trusts the judicial process, but
not when it comes to war-a principle that has been articulated in
several U.S. Supreme Court decisions.' 30  This principle was best
articulated by Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence in Dennis v.
United States:
131
History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is
jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the
day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between
competing political, economic and social pressures. Primary
responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the
situation before us of necessity belongs to the Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
Meyer's book is a rare gem from a knowledgeable author willing
to help readers understand the history of the World Court and the
thirteen original states united and each agreed.., to submit all differences to a
Supreme Court... [the founders] had every right to look forward to centuries of
unbroken peace, although in less than seventy-five years these States were
engaged in a prolonged civil war. Yet no one would call our Federal Government
a failure nor the establishment of the Supreme Court a mistake.
Id. at 37.
126. See id. at 209.
127. See id. at 216.
128. See SGI website, supra note 12.
129. See SGI website, supra note 12.
130. See, e.g., Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("When a nation is at
war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them
as protected by any constitutional right."); see also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
131. 341 U.S.494 (1951).
132. See id. at 525.
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United States' contribution to it. He succeeds in this ambitious task,
and the result is both readable and engaging. The book provides a
plethora of information as to specific court decisions and makes a
valiant effort at organizing the decisions into coherent groupings.
Despite the massive number of international law decisions handed
down by the Court, Meyer deftly guides the reader through the cases
without getting bogged down in the minutiae of each decision. Further,
beginning with a time when the Court was just an idea of a few
visionaries gives true context to the story, as does Meyer's
prophesizing about the future of the Court.
The World Court in Action: Judging Among Nations comes at a
time when international relations have been highlighted through recent
events both domestically and abroad. For example, the United States
has come under intense scrutiny by international human rights agencies
in the past year as a result of detaining many immigrants and foreign
nationals after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001." The
United States has held foreign national detainees without access to their
respective consulates, in violation of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. 34 Such behavior seems hypocritical in light of the
aforementioned United States protest when Americans were held
hostage in Iran. 135 As many Americans believe that now is the time for
the U.S. to reconsider its international position, Meyer's book comes at
the perfect time for readers to revisit the idea of an international court
of justice.
Yet, Meyer's advocacy of the utility of the World Court may be
the source of the one shortcoming of the book - that it is a bit of a one-
sided story. One can chalk this up to the habit of the lawyer of being a
"zealous advocate" for his cause, or perhaps to Meyer's persistent
belief in the power of a "true" Court to substitute law for war.
Fortunately, Meyer's apparent bias does not detract much from the
quality of the story as a whole. 136  Nevertheless, the reader is left
133. See Richard A. Serrano, Response to Terror: The Detainees Isolation, Secrecy Veil
Most Jailed in Roundup Investigation, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, at Al.
134. See William J. Aceres, International Civil Liberties Report 2000 at 5, available at
http://archive.aclu.org/library/iclr/2000/iclr2000_5.pdf (last visited August 23, 2002) (citing
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963, 21 UST 77, TIAS No. 6820).
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides that foreign nationals must be made aware of
their right to communicate with consulate officials, and if requested, to notify the consulate
that the foreign national requests assistance. Despite U.S. ratification in 1963, U.S.
compliance has been questionable. See id.
135. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
136. Other than brief mentions, Meyer leaves out the arguments of the United States
(and others) for refusing to succumb to compulsory jurisdiction. This weakens the argument
to some extent because the reader is left wondering why the material is omitted. Is it to
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feeling much as Meyer sees the World Court of today: without full
access to the dispute, and thus unable to see the facts and form
conclusions as a truly neutral third-party.
more zealously argue his case? Is it because the facts are damaging? Alternatively, would
the arguments on the other side be so minimal as to actually strengthen Meyer's points if
added?
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